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On February 25, 1607, Friar Jan Neyen, commissarygeneral of the Franciscans in the Spanish Netherlands,
secretly arrived at the Dutch town of Ryswick.

Late the

same day a carriage transported Neyen, disguised as a
traveling salesman, to The Hague where he met with repre
sentatives of the Dutch States-General.

Neyen's visit

initiated two months of clandestine negotiations to halt
the fighting between the United Provinces and the Spanish
Netherlands."'"

The bargaining reached fruition in April

with the announcement of an eight-month armistice, tempo
rarily checking the war that had raged in the Low Countries
since the 1560s.

2

For the next two years efforts to

conclude a more permanent peace dominated the European
diplomatic scene.

These negotiations directly involved

France, England, and Spain, as well as the Low Countries,
while the rest of the continent watched in anticipation.

Some explanation of my use of geographic terms is
necessary. "Netherlands" and "Low Countries" refer to all
seventeen provinces under Hapsburg rule before the revolt.
"Spanish Netherlands" and "Flanders" apply to the ten
southern provinces that remained loyal to Spain while
"United Provinces," "States," and "Dutch" designated the
rebellious North. The dates used in this essay are Old
Style, except that the year is taken to begin January 1.
For letters originally dated New Style, both dates are
given.
2

For a more complete narrative of these negotiations,
see John Lothrup Motley, History of the United Netherlands
from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Years
Truce, 1609 (New York"! Harper and Brothers, 1900), VI,
pp. 60-81; and Jan den Tex, 01denbarneveldt", 2 vols.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), II, pp.
363-72.
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The Netherlands, ruled by the Hapsburgs since the
marriage of Mary of Burgundy to Maximilian of Austria,
united with Spain upon the election of the Spanish king,
Charles I, as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519.

Charles

respected the rights and traditions of the Low Countries,
but his son Philip, who succeeded as king in 1556, imposed
political, economic, and religious restrictions that led
to open rebellion in the seventeen provinces.

These

states were never a homogenous unit, however, and as the
fighting progressed, a division developed along the Rhine
River.

In the 1580s Spanish troops led by the Duke of

Parma regained control of the southern provinces.

This

action along with expanding religious, cultural, and
economic differences resulted in a split between the
North and South.

Despite this division, the revolt con

tinued as the seven northern states persisted in their
battle against Spanish armies stationed in the reconciled
South.^
England and France, Spain's two major rivals, aided
the Dutch in their struggle for independence.

For France,

3
The split in the Netherlands remains a source of
much historical debate. For two interpretations see
Peter Geyl, The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609
(London: Williams and Forgate, Ltd., 1932); and Charles
Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970 J , pp.
1-20.
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the revolt represented another episode in its long
standing rivalry with the Hapsburgs.

Although domestic

problems and an eagerness to maintain the peace negotiated
at Cateau-Cambresis (1559) kept the French from a public
commitment, their desire to undermine Spanish interests
in the Netherlands prompted some support for the Dutch.^
French involvement in the affairs of the Low Countries
increased with the accession of Henry IV to the throne
in 1589.

Philip II, who had allied with French Catholics

in the violent, internecine religious wars that nearly
destroyed France, refused to acknowledge the Protestant
Henry as king and employed the Duke of Parma to prevent
him from occupying Paris.

This ploy failed, however, and

in 1595 Henry declared war against Philip and allied
himself with the Dutch.
Despite Elizabeth of England's lack of sympathy for
rebels, a growing fear of Spanish power and a desire for
trade in the Netherlands eventually generated English
support for the Dutch cause.

When the conquests by Parma

and the loss of Dutch leadership after the assassination
of William the Silent threatened to end the revolt,
Elizabeth dispatched the Earl of Leicester and a sizeable
army to the Low Countries.

The Spanish responded to

^Irene Mahoney, Royal Cousin, the Life of Henry IV
of France (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 103.
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England's increased support of the rebels by declaring
war and, in 1588, launching the ill-fated Armada.

This

series of events strengthened England's ties to the
United Provinces.

They were now formally allied with

the Dutch and despite Elizabeth's reluctance to pursue
actively the war with Spain, England shouldered a large
portion of the Dutch war costs.^
The fighting in the Low Countries persisted into the
early 17th century as Maurice of Nassau, commander of the
Dutch armies after the death of his father, William the
Silent, and Ambrogio Spinola, leader of the Spanish troops,
exchanged a series of successes and failures.
the fighting had reached a stalemate.

By 1604

Understandably

supporters of peace emerged in both the United Provinces
and the Spanish Netherlands.
Peace treaties signed by France and Spain at Vervins
in 1598 and by England and Spain at London in 1604 crippled
Dutch chances for a military victory and further stimulated
their desire to end the fighting.

Johann Van Oldenbarneveldt,

advocate of Holland and the most influential political
figure in the North, led the movement for peace.

Aware

that his war-weary and financially drained nation could

~*For an excellent interpretative work on Elizabeth's
policy toward the Dutch, see Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and
the Revolt in the Netherlands.
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not wage an effective war without substantial outside aid,
Oldenbarneveldt espoused peace on the condition that Dutch
independence be recognized.^
Archduke Albert, named sovereign of the Spanish
Netherlands by Philip II in 1598, also longed for peace.
The presence of a Spanish army for over forty years and
the Dutch blockade of Antwerp had ravaged the land and
economy of Flanders.

With no end to the destruction in

sight, Albert seized the initiative for peace.

Early in

1607 he dispatched Friar Neyen to The Hague, which resulted
in the eight-month armistice and an agreement to negotiate
a permanent peace based on Dutch independence.
Peace negotiations did not commence immediately, how
ever, as the Dutch refused to enter formal talks without
Spain's ratification of the cease-fire and acknowledgment
of their autonomy.

Despite the recognition of the Spanish

Netherlands as a sovereign state by his father, the new
Spanish king, Philip III, exercised considerable control
over their affairs.

Negotiations with the Archduke, no

matter how fruitful, would be meaningless without Spanish
approval.7

In early 1607 it was reported that Dutch expenditures
exceeded their revenues by 20,000 pounds per month.
7

For more complete information on the roles of Arch
duke Albert and Philip III in governing the Spanish
Netherlands, see Charles Howard Carter, The Secret Diplomacy
of the Hapsburgs, 1598-1625 (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1964), pp. 77-87.
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While the advocates of peace awaited news from Spain,
the French and English involved themselves in discussions
with the Dutch.

Both Henry IV and Elizabeth's successor,

James I, were aware that a reconciliation would affect
them and were determined to protect their nation's interests.
Initially Henry disapproved of the armistice.

Spanish

involvement in the Dutch war had freed him to concentrate
on domestic affairs and to prepare for the eventual renewal
of his struggle with the Hapsburgs.

Even before the cease

fire, Henry suggested to James that an alliance be formed
with the States to prevent peace.

However, when the English

rejected this proposal, the French monarch was hesitant to
intervene alone.

In an effort to persuade the Dutch to

continue the war without French aid, he dispatched a dele
gation headed by Pierre Jeannin to The Hague.

One of the

shrewdest politicians in France, Jeannin brought to his
post a wealth of diplomatic experience gained as Henry's
opponent in the French civil wars.

He soon found Henry's

goals to be unrealistic; without aid, the Dutch would lose
the war.

Faced with the prospect of a united Hapsburg

state to his north, Henry accepted Jeannin's advice and
began to advocate a peace that guaranteed Dutch indepen
dence.^

8

Maurice Lee, Jr., James I and Henry IV; an Essay in
English Foreign Policy, 1603-10 (Urbana, 111.: University
of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 79-83.

7

The sudden armistice forced James, like Henry, to
choose between financing a war or promoting a peace.
Although realizing that a prolongation of the conflict
favored English interests, James was unwilling and unable
to finance the Dutch.

Moreover, he considered himself a

man of peace and was indignant when he was not asked to
serve as a mediator.

9

James's eagerness to convince the

Dutch of his friendship without endangering his rapproche
ment with Spain increased the difficulty of his decision.
Faced with these dilemmas, James and his Secretary of
State, Robert Cecil, attempted to formulate a foreign
policy that would enable England to play a major role in
the outcome of the negotiations at The Hague.

This essay

deals with the complicated and confusing story of these
efforts.

Although the first few months of 1607 presented James
and Cecil with several opportunities to stymie Dutch and
Flemish peace efforts, they showed little inclination to
do so.

In January Ralph Wim^ood, the English ambassador

q
Cecil to Winwood, 2 April 1607; Cecil to Cornwallis,
12 April 1607, E. Sawyer, ed., Memorials of the Affairs
of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I.
Collected chiefly from the original papers of Sir . . .
Ralph Winwood, vol. TI (London , 17 2 5), pp. 288-9 and 302 - 3.
Hereafter cited as Winwood.
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in the Netherlands, reported to Cecil, Henry's desire to
prolong the fighting through the formation of a tripartite
alliance.

The response to this overture was cool.

William Browne, assistant-governor at the Dutch cautionary
town of Flushing, believed the French had proposed the
league only to make the States feel that James's backward
ness was forcing them to peace.^

Cecil questioned the

wisdom of risking a war that would not guarantee "some
access to power to this Kingdom [England] to countervail
the hazard and expense, which it would be forced to
12
undergo."

The English reaction disappointed those who

had looked to James for financial support to protract the
war.

Winwood lamented that the failure of England and

France to cooperate would cause hardship for the Dutch,
while Prince Maurice vented his anger against James who

Winwood to Cecil, 14 January 1607, M. S. Giuseppi
and D. McN. Lockie, eds., Report on the Manuscripts of the
Marquess of Salisbury, vols. XIX-XX, Historical Manuscripts
Commission publication (London, 1930-65), XIX, pp. 7-8.
Hereafter cited as Salisbury.
"^Browne to Lisle, 9 February 1607, W. A. Shaw and
G. D. Owen, eds., Report on the Manuscripts of Lord De
L'Isle and Dudley, vols. III-IV, Historical Manuscripts
Commission publication (London, 1936-40), III, p. 349.
Hereafter cited as De L'Isle. During the Elizabethan
period, the Dutch allowed England to establish garrisons
in several key coastal cities. Browne was an English
official at one of these "cautionary town" garrisons.
"^Cecil to Winwood, 21 February 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
pp. 50-1.

9

in his opinion had weakened the war effort through
hesitation.

Maurice considered England the key to con

tinuation of the war; France would break its peace with
Spain only after James promised to subsidize the States.
Aid was not forthcoming, however.

13

Even the announce

ment of the cease-fire in April did not prod the English
to pledge assistance.

To the contrary, James complained

that the Dutch had not invited him to mediate in the
armistice negotiations."^

In response to this affront

the king refused to dispatch an advisory council to The
Hague.

He demanded instead that the States send a delega

tion to England to explain their actions and to suggest a
course of action that he might follow."^

This decision

greatly limited English contact with the Dutch during the
months immediately following the cessation of hostilities.
Although Ralph Winwood was stationed at The Hague, he
received no specific instructions and took little initiative
in negotiating with Dutch officials.

Meanwhile, Pierre

Jeannin was meeting with leaders in the States, familiar
izing himself and Henry with their position.

As a result

"^Brown to Lisle, 24 January, 7 March 1607, De L'Isle,
III, pp. 345, 354-7.
"^Cecil to Winwood, 30 April 1607, Winwood, pp. 305-6.
"'"^Cecil to Winwood, 6 June 1607 , ibid., pp. 313-5.
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the English relied heavily upon France for information
concerning the States.

When in May, Cecil recalled Winwood

for a briefing on the Dutch situation, he instructed him
to consult first with Jeannin who had "better information
of the condition of affairs.
The English populace responded negatively to the
announcement of the armistice.

Opinion in London was

rabidly anti-Spanish and many merchants feared that peace
17
would damage English trade by reviving Dutch competition.
In spite of these pro-war sentiments, James maintained a
public neutrality, refusing to reveal his reaction to the
cease-fire before the arrival of the Dutch deputation.
This policy angered Henry IV.

He desired to cooperate

with England and made several attempts through his ambas
sador to discern James's feelings on the Dutch situation.
The English king assured Henry of his "reciprocal desire
to concur with him" but reaffirmed his decision to suspend
18
any policy commitments until his meeting with the Dutch.
In July the Dutch delegates, Dr. Jehan Berkes and Sir
James Maldaree, finally arrived in London.

After justifying

their nation's failure to contact England during the

"^Cecil to Winwood, 8 May 1607, ibid., pp. 309-10.
"^Robert Savage to Cecil, 18 April, 16 July 1607,
Salisbury, XIX, pp. 98-9, 175.
18
Cecil to Winwood, 20 April 1607, Winwood, pp. 305-6.
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armistice negotiations, the two commissioners requested
that James send a deputation to join with the French in
advising the States.

Satisfied that the Dutch had made

amends for their diplomatic improprietries, James quickly
acquiesced, promising the deputies that, like Elizabeth,
he would support the Dutch in their drive for freedom.
Yet he made no specific guarantees.

He limited himself

to general assurances of his care for the States, while
stressing that they alone could decide what course of
action would best achieve independence.

19

Even after the

envoys emphasized that without English aid Dutch financial
woes would force them to make peace, James pledged nothing.
As a result the commissioners left England convinced that
they had found more support for peace than war.

20

The

Venetian ambassador Giustinian developed the same opinion.
"The king," he reported, "as yet shows little inclination
to upset the peace negotiations."

A week later it appeared

clear to him that James would not oppose an agreement that
guaranteed sovereignty, since the monarch's real goal was
to keep the States out of French or Spanish hands.

21

19
Cecil to Cornwallis, 15 July 1607, ibid., pp. 325-7;
Cecil to the Secretary of Scotland, August 1607, Salisbury,
XIX, pp. 236-8.
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 15/25 July 1607,
Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State
Papers . . . Venice, vol. XI (London, 1900), pp. 16-17.
Hereafter cited asVenetian.
21
Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 22 July/1 August,
79 Jnlv/8 Anpust 1 607 , ibid., pp. 18-19, 21-22.
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In late July, while the Dutch delegation was still in
England, the long-awaited Spanish ratification of the
armistice arrived at The Hague.
plete, however.

The agreation was incom

Philip III had recognized the Archduke's

right to negotiate a treaty in his name but failed to
acknowledge Dutch independence.

Also, he had signed the

ratification "I, the King," a form used to address subjects,
rather than "Philip, King," which the Dutch had requested.
These defects led the United Provinces to return the
agreation to Spain, demanding amendments within six weeks.

22

Hesitant to act in opposition to Philip, James decided to
defer his newly-appointed commissioners to The Hague until
he received news of Spain's response to the Dutch demands.

23

Although Cecil reckoned this answer would be slow in coming
due to the Spanish tendency to "proceed in all things by
degrees, taking that to be greatness," the delay was a short
one.^

James, pressured by Henry and aware that further

procrastination would harm relations with the Dutch, decided

^Piero Pruili to Doge and Senate, 10/20 August 1607,
ibid., p. 24; Browne to Lisle, 30 July, 19 August 1607,
De L'Isle, III, pp. 389-90, 393-4.
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 12/22 August, 19/29
August 1607, Venetian, pp. 256, 257.
24
Cecil to the Secretary of Scotland, August 1607,
Salisbury, XIX, pp. 236-8.
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in late August to dispatch the deputation without news
from Spain.

25

On September 1 the English commissioners, Ralph Winwood
and Richard Spencer, landed at Flushing and proceeded
quickly to The Hague.

With them they carried general

instructions, which included nothing to indicate the English
would take any initiative in pressing for peace.

Winwood's

and Spencer's primary task was to discover the attitudes of
other involved parties toward a treaty.

James refused to

set policy without first consulting the Dutch and French,
and, accordingly, the delegation was to commit itself to
nothing before providing him and Cecil with knowledge of how
things stood on all sides.

French advice and Dutch desires

would dictate English moves; Winwood and Spencer were to
collaborate closely with Jeannin and to rely upon his
counsel, while the Dutch were to determine their own course
of action.

The instructions urged the commissioners to

point out the possible dangers of a treaty but cautioned
them against opposing peace if the Dutch wanted it.

If

the States desired war they were to encourage them without
.

.

.

,

promising increased support.

2 6

Browne to Lisle, 9 August 1607, De L'Isle, III,
pp. 393-4; Giustinian to Doge and Senate" 12/22 August
1607, Venetian, pp. 25-6.
26

Instructions to Winwood and Spencer, August 1607,
Winwood, pp. 329-35.
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Soon after their arrival Winwood and Spencer appeared
before the Dutch States - General pledging a continuation of
the long-standing amity between their nations.

27

Desiring

a more definitive statement of their allies' position,
Dutch officials asked the French and English deputies either
to promise aid to maintain the war or to support peace by
advising them in negotiations.

After conferring, the com

missioners reaffirmed their willingness to follow a course
that would most benefit the States.

They refused to promise

military aid, however, leaving the Dutch no alternative but
peace.

28

Several English agents in the United Provinces roundly
criticized their nation's policies.

William Browne saw

English caution as pushing the Dutch into a peace that
would be difficult to stop.

Upset that "we [England]

counsel them neither way," Browne feared the Dutch would
choose "that folly, which they will . . . repent."

He

attacked Winwood and Spencer for trying only to avoid
annoying the Dutch rather than taking strong actions to
prevent peace.

29

The perception that England wanted only

to please the States was not new.

After the departure of

?7

Browne to Lisle, 1 September 1607, De L'Isle, III,
pp. 399-400.
28

Browne to Lisle, 13 September 1607; Throckmorton to
Lisle, 13 September 1607, ibid., pp. 404-5, 405-6.
29

Browne to Lisle, 26 September, 1 October 1607, ibid.,
pp. 406-8, 413.
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Winwood and Spencer from England, Giustinian commented
that he did not expect the mission to hinder peace because
it had been sent "chiefly to please the Dutch and ... to
preserve that reputation, which the English desire to
30
possess m Holland."

John Throckmorton, an aide to

Browne, saw a strong division in the United Provinces over
the issue of peace and suggested that James ally himself
with war advocates, a move that would prevent peace negoti31
ations and, in his opinion, benefit England.

These

recommendations fell on deaf ears as the English maintained
their noncommittal attitude throughout September and early
October.

James refused to prevent peace, yet was indisposed

to support it forcefully.

When Winwood, frustrated with

his nebulous position at The Hague, requested further
instructions in late September, Assistant Secretary of State
Levinus Munke informed him that the uncertainty of the
situation made this impossible.

32

Affirming this position,

James wrote Cecil that until he could better perceive the
course favored by other nations it would be of no benefit
33
to commit himself further.
30

Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 26 August/5 September
1607, Venetian, p. 29.
31
Throckmorton to Lisle, 23 September 1607, De L'Isle,
III, pp. 410-1.
32

Levinus Munke to Winwood, 17 October 1607, Winwood,

p. 350.
33James

dp. 285-6.

to Cecil, 19 October 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
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This policy ended in mid-October with the arrival of
the second Spanish agreation.

The new ratification included

a specific offer of sovereignty but remained incomplete in
several areas.

Philip again signed it "I, the King" and

called for nullification of Dutch independence if agreement
was not reached on other issues such as trade and religion."^
Despite these limitations Winwood and Spencer considered
the Spanish offer satisfactory.

In a letter to the States-

General the commissioners urged them to accept the agreation
and begin negotiations for peace.

If the States spurned the

Spanish terms, Winwood and Spencer warned that they could
not expect aid for a war that the English would consider
35
"unjustified so as it is unnecessary."

These remarks won

praise from James and Cecil, who agreed that although the
ratification was defective in some ways, it corresponded so
closely with what the Dutch had demanded that a rejection
would be dishonorable.

36

Several factors led the English to this sudden and
dramatic shift in policy.

James's financial position,

always precarious, took a turn for the worse at this time.
Twice during October he pleaded with his Privy Council for

34
Cornwallis to Cecil, 14 October 1607, Winwood, pp.
348-9; Browne to Lisle, 20 October 1607, De L'Isle, III,
pp. 418-21.
35

Winwood and Spencer to the States-General, 20 October
1607, De L'Isle, III, pp. 467-8.
36

Cecil to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood,
t)D. 357-9.
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loans to alleviate his "eating canker of want."

37

England's

inability to finance a war was coupled with an increasing
awareness of Dutch and French preferences for peace.

Olden-

barneveldt and other Dutch leaders who had resolved to
negotiate were gaining ascendancy at The Hague, and even
Zeeland, long the most warlike of the Dutch provinces,
appeared drifting .toward pacifism.

Before the arrival of

the agreation William Browne reported peace feelings to be
so strong in the United Provinces that he had been warned
38
not to speak in favor of war for fear of assault.

Henry

IV, unwilling to risk another war with Spain, also favored
negotiations.

This sentiment soon assumed dominance as

Winwood and Spencer collaborated closely with Jeannin during
the weeks preceding the arrival of Philip's ratification.
Both the English and French trusted that their cooperation
would erase any dangers a peace might produce.

39

Finally,

a desire for good relations with Spain predetermined the
English conduct.

In September Cecil instructed Charles

Cornwallis, his ambassador in Spain, to remind Philip of
James's tendency toward peace.

This, Cecil argued, was a

"^James to Cecil, 19 October 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
pp. 285-6.
38

Browne to Lisle, 18 September, 6 October, 14 October
1607, De L'Isle, III, pp. 401-2, 414-5, 415-7.
39

Browne to Lisle, 29 August, 16 September .1607 ,
ibid., pp. 396-9, 406-8.
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true sign of cordiality since nations traditionally seek
to keep their enemies occupied in war/"

Browne suspected

that Winwood and Spencer designed their actions to show
Spain that England would do nothing to hinder peace/"''
Cecil confirmed this suspicion suggesting to Cornwallis
that he use England's acceptance of the agreation as a sign
of James's sincerity to the Spanish.^
England's energetic advocacy of Philip's ratification
did not last for long, however, as the unexpected flight
of Hugh O'Neill, the Earl of Tyrone, elicited doubts con
cerning the benefits of peace.

During the 1590s Tyrone

had led an abortive rebellion to free Ireland from Eliza
beth's rule, and despite a pardon from James, suspicions
of his loyalty lingered.

When the Irish Earl began to

dispute English land policies in his homeland, James
summoned him to London, precipitating his flight from
Ireland in September of 1607.

Archduke Albert granted

Tyrone refuge in the Spanish Netherlands, but the English
feared he was on his way to Spain where Philip, who had
encouraged and succoured his past revolt, would aid in

40
Cecil to Cornwallis, 27 September 1607, Winwood,
pp. 340-4.
^Browne to Lisle, 20 October 1607, De L'Isle, III,
pp. 418-21.
42

Cecil to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood,
pp. 3 5 7-9.
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fomenting another.

When James demanded that Philip and

Albert state their intentions, evasive replies strained
43
relations to a breaking point.

The precarious situation

roused James to order military preparations, reviving
hopes among war advocates.

The affair also aggravated

France and England's synergetic ties.

After his flight

from Ireland, Tyrone first landed in France, and James
immediately asked Henry to detain him.

Although he

acquiesced at first, Henry soon released Tyrone allowing
his safe passage to Flanders.

The French king maintained

that James's petition had been unclear and that O'Neill
was a religious rather than a political fugitive, but the
Venetian ambassador in France suggested the motivation
was actually Henry's strong dislike for James.44

Whatever

the reason, the French action incensed the English monarch
and undermined the Anglo-French cooperation that heretofore
had made James so confident in peace.
Reports that the Dutch were balking at the Spanish
agreation heightened English vacillation.

A strong war

party led by Maurice of Nassua had always thrived in the
States, and Philip's limited offer prompted many peace

Thomas Lake to Cecil, 14 October 1607, Salisbury,
XIX, pp. 278-9; Piero Pruili to Doge and Senate^ 10/20
October, 18/28 October 1607, Venetian, pp. 48-51.
^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 21/31 October 1607,
Venetian, pp. 52-3.
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supporters to alter their views.

45

By November Winwood

and Spencer were reporting that the Dutch would continue
fighting if means could be found.^

This news brought

Cecil to question his commissioner's push for peace nego
tiations.

In a November 18 letter to Thomas Edmondes,

English ambassador to Flanders, the Secretary indicated
the safest course would be to reserve advocacy of peace
lest "the success prove contrary to the States' expecta47
tions."

Winwood, aware of the changing opinion in

England, intimated to his friend John Chamberlain that
although his and Spencer's reputations might be blemished,
they had made the correct decision since His Majesty had
no intention of going to war.

48

Indeed, James remained

unwilling to subsidize the Dutch war effort.

Talk of an

Anglo-Spanish marriage alliance, Philip's propositions that
James should mediate peace negotiations, and the English
monarch's aversion to fighting soothed tense relations with

^Browne to Lisle, 9 November, 14 November 1607,
De L'Isle, III, pp. 429-31, 432-3.
^Browne to Lisle, 22 November 1607, ibid., pp. 435-7.
^Cecil to Edmondes, 18 November 1607, Salisbury,
XIX, pp. 327-9.
48

Winwood to Chamberlain, 8 December 1607, Great
Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers
Relating to Holland, 1603-10, vol. 66, ff. 75v-76v.
Hereafter cited as PRO Holland.

21

Spain; and when Tyrone's threat dissipated in November, the
49
possibility of English involvement in a war ended.
Uncertain what stand would best serve their interests,
the English adopted a policy of caution; they resolved to
evade all further commitments while allowing France to lead
in advising the Dutch.

Cecil, commenting on Winwood and

Spencer's November 22 request for additional direction,
suggested to James that the commissioners could best serve
English concerns by steering a middle course between the
extremes of supporting war and leading a peace movement.^
The king heeded this counsel, and on December 5 his secre
tary, Thomas Lake, informed Cecil of a revised policy
concerning the Spanish agreation.

Winwood and Spencer were

to avoid further advice to the United Provinces, as any
stance would incur either Dutch or Spanish wrath.

The

States, James reasoned, should decide for themselves in
this matter, or, if necessary, they could rely on French
guidance/"'"

A later dispatch from the Privy Council enjoined
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Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 18/28 November, 28
November/5 December, 31 December/10 January 1607, Venetian,
pp. 65-6, 70-1, 81-2. Tyrone never did go to Spain. In
February 1608 he left Flanders for Rome, where he had been
offered a pension by Paul V. He remained in the Eternal
City until his death in 1616.
^Observations on . . . the Low Countries, 1607, PRO
Holland, ff. 85v-88.
"^Thomas Lake to Cecil, 5 December 1607, Salisbury,
XIX, pp. 358-60.
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the commissioners not to be "leaders but followers."

They

were not to refuse advice to the Dutch, perpetuating the
appearance of James's concern for their security, but should
carefully avoid any commitments.

52

In no area was this disavowal of initiative more
evident than in England's dealings apropos a defensive
alliance.

Even though the Dutch considered a league with

James and Henry necessary for peace, the English were chary
of the idea.

Fearing that involvement in an alliance would

threaten their peace with Spain while benefiting only the
States, James and Cecil directed Winwood and Spencer to
postpone any decision on an alliance as long as possible.
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Despite England's disinterested attitude, the Dutch
continued to press for an agreement.

In early November

they proffered a tripartite league providing for AngloFrench aid to the Dutch after a truce or treaty and mutual
aid if war resumed with Spain.
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The English saw the Dutch

demands as exorbitant and soundly rejected their proposal.

52
Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 11 December
1607, Thomas Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations
between the Courts of England, France, Brussels from the
year 1592-1667. Extracted chiefly from the State papers
of Sir Thomas Edmondes . . . and of Anthony Bacon, 1749,
pp. 2 74-5.
^Instructions to Winwood and Spencer, August 1607,
Winwood, pp. 329-35.
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Browne to Lisle, 9 November 1607, De L'Isle, III,
pp. 429-31.
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After reading an abstract of the suggested league sent him
by Cecil, James complained that the States intended "to
take all the advantages ... to themselves" while offering
little in return.

The notion of aiding the United Provinces

during peacetime particularly enraged the monarch; he
intimated that if the Dutch could not support themselves,
they were not worthy of independence and should be divided
between England and France.

Contending that Philip would

like nothing better than to see England waste its limited
resources, James proclaimed he would rather see the States
fall into Spanish hands than "starve myself or mine by
putting the meat in their [the Dutch] mouth."

He insisted,

instead, that money flow the other way, since peace would
revive the Dutch economy.
Despite these grievances, French support of a league
and previous English commitments to Dutch welfare impelled
James and Cecil to acknowledge the necessity of an alliance.
They advocated a much more limited agreement than the
States, however.

Concerned that the Spanish might see a

league as an attempt to reopen the fighting, the English
desired a treaty contingent upon peace.

They also favored

replacing the proposed triple alliance with a series of

"^James to Cecil, 1 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
pp. 351 3.
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bilateral pacts involving no English ties to France.^

A

tripartite league, James argued, would primarily benefit
Henry, who "because of his own age and the youth of his
children, their legitimation, the strength of competitors
and universal hatred borne unto him . . . seek[s] all
means of security for preventing all dangers."
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In late

November Winwood and Spencer received further instructions
from England.

They were to bargain for a separate alliance,

stating all promises of assistance in general terms.

If,

however, a more specific engagement was required, aid was
not to exceed 6,000 men, 20 ships, and 30,000 crowns per
year.

Also, any agreement required provisions for yearly

support of English cautionary towns in the Netherlands.
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The Dutch considered these conditions unreasonable and
negotiations stalled.

As Winwood and Spencer looked for

authorization to support an alliance more suitable to the
States, Jeannin initiated negotiations for a separate
agreement.

The French promised the United Provinces 10,000

5^Cecil

to Cornwallis, 18 November 1607, Winwood,
pp. 357-9; Cecil to Edmondes, 18 November 1607, Salisbury,
XIX, pp. 328-9.
57
James to Cecil, 1 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
pp. 351- 3.

S 8 Memoranda made by Cecil relative to the Treaties
with the States-General, November 1607, ibid., pp. 483-4.
The States' debt to England can be traced back to aid
provided by Elizabeth in the late 16th century. In 1598
this debt was set at 800,000 pounds with the agreement
that the Dutch would make yearly payments and pay for the
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foot soldiers if hostilities resumed and demanded one-half
of this amount from the Dutch in case Henry and Philip
went to war.

The Dutch accepted these terms, and in January

1608 the two nations signed a defensive pact.
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This coup was a notable propaganda victory for Henry
IV.

His decisive action increased French prestige in the

United Provinces while magnifying skepticism of James's
sincerity.

English officials were becoming painfully aware

that in the eight months since the cease-fire, their
cautious policies had failed to place England in a position
of influence at The Hague.

As early as December 4 William

Browne expressed fears that English ambivalence would allow
France to dominate as they had during the Venetian Crisis
of 1606.^

By January Winwood and Spencer were complaining

maintenance of the cautionary towns. The towns were never
financed, and after two years the Dutch discontinued pay
ments on their debt, a situation England hoped to rectify
in the defensive alliance. For more specific figures on
the debt, see The State of Debt of the United Provinces by
Way of Estimation, 14 December 1607, PRO Holland, ff. 77v.
59
Browne to Lisle. 11 January 1607, De L'Isle, IV, p. 3.
^Browne to Cecil, 4 December 1607, Salisbury, XIX,
pp. 338-9. In 1606 a squabble developed when two priests
violated Venetian law and were brought to trial by the
State. Claiming jurisdiction over all cases involving
clergymen, Pope Paul V demanded that the priests be turned
over to him. When Venice refused, he placed them under
interdict. The nations of Europe took sides and a war
appeared possible. Although James offered to mediate, he
procrastinated, and it was Henry IV, aided by his personal
emissary Cardinal Joyeuse, who negotiated a solution to
the crisis.
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that as a result of the Franco-Dutch alliance, the States
consulted Jeannin more frequently on important matters.^"1"
Desiring to satisfy both the United Provinces and Spain,
the English had pleased neither.

These nations, bothered

by James's equivocation, began to doubt his interest in
their welfare and turned elsewhere for counsel.

By eschew

ing all initiative, the English made French domination of
the negotiations possible and relegated themselves to
spectators--concerned bystanders certainly, but ones with
less and less control over the direction of events.
In mid-December the Dutch, influenced by French
urgings, accepted Philip's agreation and invited the
Spanish Netherlands to send delegates for formal peace
62
talks.

This decision pleased the Archduke.

He promptly

dispatched his negotiators and asked both England and
France to aid in the discussions.

In response to this

request, Cecil assured the Flemish that despite hostile
acts such as Albert's harboring of Tyrone the English would
63
work for peace.

When negotiations convened in January

1608, Dutch independence was the first issue discussed.

^Thomas Ogle to Cecil, 4 January 1608, ibid., XX,
pp. 2 - 4.
f\ 9
Ogle to Cecil, 13 December 1607, ibid., pp. 376-7;
Browne to Lisle, 19 December 1607, De L'Isle, III, pp.
445-6.
Cecil to Edmondes, 14 January 1608, Salisbury, XX,
pp. 19-20.
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The States demanded a more specific recognition of sover
eignty before proceeding to other matters, a stand many
believed would prove unacceptable to the Archduke.

Fearful

that others might blame James if the negotiations stalled,
the Privy Council directed Winwood and Spencer to warn the
United Provinces not to press their demands too strongly.
England's anxiety was needless, however, for Albert quickly
conceded the Dutch request.^

Although many were optimistic

that this would soon bring peace, the question of Dutch
trade in the Indies emerged as a new impediment.

The States

demanded free trade rights in the Spanish colonial world;
Spain, on the other hand, insisted upon immediate Dutch
withdrawal from these areas.

Despite this conflict the

English expected the parties to reach a quick compromise.
Neither side was eager to adjust their demands, however,
and by early February the talks had reached an impasse.^
Meanwhile, the English, realizing further hesitation
would destroy their credibility in the United Provinces and
guarantee Henry's eminence, resumed efforts to conclude a
defensive alliance.

Even with the French stimulus, negoti

ations proceeded slowly.

The Dutch continued to press for

^Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 21/31 January 1608,
Venetian, pp. 89-90; Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer,
Winwood, 3 February 1608, pp. 369-74.
^Ogle to Cecil, 7 February 1608; Noel Caron to Cecil,
February 1608, Salisbury, XX, pp. 57-8, 91 2.
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peacetime aid and wanted their commitment set at one-half
the English promise.

Moreover, they asked James to post

pone debt payments for several years after the peace.
Although the English added 400 horses to their offer of
aid and agreed to cut the first two debt increments to
30,000 pounds they repudiated peacetime support and a
Dutch commitment less than two-thirds.

James also rejected

a suggestion that any French aid to the States be credited
against Henry's debt to England.

This would have enlarged

the Dutch treasury, increasing their ability to repay
England, but James held firm, claiming it was merely anothe
French attempt to gain Dutch favor at his expense.^
Winwood and Spencer were ambiguous in their meetings
with the Dutch, gaining praise from James for their refusal
"to engage him too far by giving the States certain hopes,
67
or to discourage them by the contrary."

Negative reac

tions emanating from Madrid and Brussels concerning the
proposed league may have prompted this caution.

James and

his ambassadors, concerned that the negotiations might
rupture their peace with Spain, reminded Philip and Albert
that the alliance's only purpose was to encourage peace,
but as the talks dragged on, opposition intensified.

^Browne to Lisle, 11 January 1608, De L'Isle, IV,
p. 33.
F\ 7
Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608,
Winwood, pp. 376-8.
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Philip and the Archduke attacked England for allying with
rebels and putting unwarranted restrictions on the Treaty
of London.^

This criticism angered Cecil, who considered

the league an attempt to further peace
beneficial to Spain.

and therefore

He insisted the claims were unfounded;

since the alliance went into effect only if Spain violated
their proposed peace with the States, it posed no threat to
the Spaniards as long as Philip honored his promises.

To

relieve further suspicions, Cecil tendered a similar defen
sive pact to Philip and Albert while Winwood and Spencer
urged the Dutch to inform the Archduke's delegates that
without a defensive alliance peace was out of the question.69
Difficulties existed but the completion of an agreement
was never in doubt.

The Dutch saw a league as imperative

for a stable peace, and despite fears of Spanish reprisals,
James was reluctant to drive the States into further
dependence on France.
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In the end, both parties were

willing to compromise, and in June an Anglo-Dutch alliance

^Guistinian to Doge and Senate, 17/27 March 1608,
Venetian, pp. 109-10.
69

Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 21 May 1608, Winwood,
pp. 403-5; Cecil to Edmondes, 4 May, 31 May 1608, Salisbury,
XX, pp. 152-3, 175-6; also see Cecil's May letters to
Cornwallis in Winwood.
70
Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608,
Winwood, pp. 376-8.
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was concluded.

The English would provide 10,000 soldiers,

400 horses, and 20 ships if Spain violated the peace; the
Dutch were to provide two-thirds of this amount.

The

agreement also included an English refusal to subsidize
the United Provinces during peacetime and a Dutch promise
to repay their debt in yearly increments of 60,000 pounds
beginning two years after the peace. 71
While the English and Dutch haggled over a league to
guarantee peace, problems concerning the Indies trade
increased the likelihood of war.

The States continued to

insist on full trade rights in the Indies, threatening a
resumption of fighting if their demands were not met.
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Noel Caron, the Dutch agent in England, considered yielding
on this issue too dear a price to pay especially since, in
his view, the United Provinces had proved themselves
stronger than Spain on the battlefield.
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Likewise, the

Spanish remained firm in their request for Dutch withdrawal,
claiming that the States' presence in the Indies would

71
Principal heads of the league to be concluded
betwixt His Majesty and the States, 31 May 1608, ibid.,
p. 409; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 10/17 April 1608,
Venetian, pp. 123-4.

^Ogle to Cecil, 21 February, 1 March 1608, PRO
Holland, ff. 96v-98, ff. 98v-100.
^Caron to Cecil, 25 February 1608, Salisbury, XX,
p. 83.
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oblige them to sail fully armed.^

Philip's demands for

religious freedom in the Netherlands made peace appear
even more unattainable.

The States argued that their

sovereignty prevented any outside regulation of domestic
matters and unequivocally refused.
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By April Dutch and

Spanish immoderation had brought the negotiations to a
standstill.

To break this deadlock, Archduke Albert, who

had shown a willingness to accommodate the States, dis
patched Friar Neyen to sound out Philip's attitude toward
compromise.
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The dwindling possibility of peace increased English
confusion as to what policy would best serve their interests.
Although Winwood and Spencer continued to support a treaty
and were consoled in knowing that the Spanish and Dutch
also desired peace, many Englishmen began expressing doubts
that they had allowed negotiations to proceed too far.
Cecil chastised his commissioners for supporting a peace
likely "to add but trouble and care unto us in these parts."
He hesitated to suggest subversion of the talks, however;
concern for relations with Spain and the States necessitated

^Girolamo Sorzano to Doge and Senate, 19 February,
1 March 1608, Venetian, p. 101.
75

Cornwallis to Privy Council, 2 April 1608, Winwood,
pp. 384-5.
^Caron to Cecil, 25 February 1608, Salisbury, XX,
p. 83.
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caution.

77

Giustinian believed by late March that the

English no longer wanted peace if it meant free trade for
the Dutch.

The Treaty of London had denied England this

concession, and they did not relish seeing such an advantage pass into the hands of a rising commercial power.
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A few weeks later Cornwallis exhorted Cecil to oppose peace.
"The considerations which heretofore had moved us to affect
the peace," he wrote, "are . . . changed into more forcible
reasons to determine a continuance of war."

According to

Cornwallis, a treaty might bring some benefits, but it
would leave the Spanish "without a seat of war" and mean
gains for Catholicism.
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In early June English attention shifted dramatically
to events in France.

News arrived in London that a Spanish

mission, headed by Don Pedro de Toledo, had arrived in
Paris to arrange a Franco-Spanish marriage alliance.

In

an attempt to gain French support for a peace without Dutch
independence, Don Pedro suggested a match between the
Spanish Infanta and a French prince, with the Netherland's
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Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1608, Winwood,
pp. 378-9; Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 20/30 ApriT^ 4/14
May 1608, Venetian, pp. 126-7, 132-5.
7R

Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 17/27 March 1608,
Venetian, pp. 110-1.
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384-5.

Cornwallis to Cecil, 2 April 1608, Winwood, pp.
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as a dowry upon the death of the childless Archduke and
his wife Isabella. 8 0
sternation in England.

This proposal engendered great con
The uncomforting thoughts of an

alliance between the two Catholic nations and hostile
control of the Low Countries redoubled cries for the
resumption of war aid to the Dutch.

Winwood's contact in

London, John More, underscored the need to "strike close
hands with the States" to prevent consummation of the
marriage alliance from causing a Dutch defeat.

A league

with the States, More maintained, would also assure the
Dutch of English friendship at a time when they doubted
French sincerity.
More held little hope that James would act, however.
Because the king inclined toward peace and could not afford
to finance a war, he believed his suggestions "but wind."
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Henry Neville, another of Winwood's associates, also pre
dicted inaction.

James, he charged, was "afraid of every

shadow" least it should anger Spain and would make no effort
82
to resuscitate the Dutch war effort.

As anticipated, the

English leaders sustained their position.

James had always

had qualms about aid to the States, and when a small Irish
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Cornwallis to Privy Council, 4 June 1608, ibid.,
pp. 409-10; William Resould to Cecil, 25 May 1608, Salisbury,
XX, pp- 172-3.
O1
Thomas More to Winwood, 25 June 1608, Winwood, pp.
412-3.
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Henry Neville to Winwood, 21 June 1608, ibid., pp.
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uprising occurred in early June, fears that Philip might
aid the rebellion made him "more determined than ever to
avoid mixing in anything that would cause annoyance to
Spain."

8

Although Cecil was becoming convinced that a

continuation of hostilities would be more beneficial than
peace, he too saw it as unwise to begin advocating war
while both Spain and the States supported peace.

Both men

sensed Don Pedro's proposals would come to nothing, making
action unnecessary.

It was unlikely that Henry, noted for

his pragmatism, would sacrifice friendship and influence
with the Dutch for Spanish promises of future benefits.
The mission did, in fact, prove to be a fiasco.
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Not an

insignificant factor in its failure was Don Pedro's
handling of the negotiations.

In his first formal meeting

with Henry he berated the French for their support of the
States; later the marriage alliance was offered on the
condition that France encourage the United Provinces to
accept peace without independence.

These intimidating

tactics alienated Henry and doomed the prospects of a
Franco-Spanish alliance.
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Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 15/25 June 1608,
Venetian, pp. 142-3.
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Cecil to Antoine Boderie, 13 July 1608, Salisbury,
XX, pp. 215-6; Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 26 July 1608,
Winwood, pp. 421-3.
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Don Pedro muddled his assignment, but his mere presence
in Paris strained relations between Henry and James.

That

France even considered the Spanish proposals intensified
distrust of Henry and fanned religious prejudices in England.
To many, France was unreliable as long as its king remained
"a good son to the mother of Rome."^

Even the rejection of

Don Pedro's scheme continued to arouse suspicion.

Henry, it

was thought, dismissed the offer to ingratiate himself with
the Dutch.
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This animosity soon faded, and for a time it

appeared as if the Spanish mission might actually bring
about a formal Anglo-French alliance.

Despite his personal

distaste for James, Henry had always deemed England a more
logical ally than Spain and espoused a tripartite league to
tie England, France, and the Dutch in a mutual defensive
pact.

After Don Pedro's arrival, Antoine Boderie, the

French ambassador to England, revived the idea in hopes
that dread of a hostile alliance would make James more
amenable to a union.

88

Cecil reacted favorably to this

proposal, and informal talks were initiated.

Difficulties

^Cornwallis to Cecil, 30 July 1608, ibid, pp. 420-1.
87Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 26 July 1608, ibid.,
pp. 421 3.
88

Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 7 August 1608,
ibid. , pp. 427-9.
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quickly arose, however, as the English opposed a French
suggestion to encompass the United Provinces in the league.
When the failure of Don Pedro's efforts became apparent,
James and Cecil lost all interest in the project and
Boderie ceased expounding it.^
In August attention again focused on The Hague as
Friar Neyen arrived from Spain with instructions.

Philip

remained firm in his demands; Dutch autonomy would be
withheld unless the States granted freedom of religion and
90
relinquished claims to the Indies trade.

The United

Provinces rejected these demands, and the collapse of the
negotiations appeared imminent.

Cecil, certain of peace

in a late July dispatch to Winwood and Spencer, now pre91
dieted the disruption of talks.

The Archduke's negoti

ators, led by Ambrogio Spinola, refused to allow peace to
slip away so easily.

However rigid in his requirements

for a treaty, Philip had left open the possibility of a
long truce, and Spinola seized this opportunity to save
92
the negotiations.

France and England quickly supported
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Giustinian to Doge and Senate, 11/21 August, 17/27
August 1608, Venetian, pp. 160, 163.
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 7 August 1608,
Winwood, pp. 427-9.
91Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 26 July 1608, ibid.,
pp. 421-3; Cecil to Edmondes, 14 September 1608, Salisbury.
XX, p. 24.
^Browne to Lisle, 30 June 1608 , De L'Isle, IV, pp.
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his attempts to arrange a truce now that permanent peace
seemed unattainable.

Henry had always preferred war if

a treaty could not be contracted, but in mid-1608, Jeannin
convinced him that unless he intended to actively enter
the war a truce was the only way to prevent Hapsburg control in the Low Countries.
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Despite its growing doubts

respecting peace, England also endorsed a long truce.
James, aware that he could not finance the Dutch, perceived
that a resumption of fighting would result in either Spanis
or French control over the United Provinces.

If the States

remained unaided, war posed much more of a threat to his
94
interests than peace under any conditions.

The English,

to a large extent, were simply reacting to the French lead.
Realizing Don Pedro's presence in Paris and Jeannin's
influence in the States gave France special access to
Spanish and Dutch attitudes, James considered Henry's chang
of heart a reflection of the two nations' opinions of the
truce.

By opposing France's decision, the monarch believed

England would be resisting Spanish and Dutch desires,
something he had been avoiding throughout the negotiations.
Accordingly, the Privy Council enjoined Winwood and Spencer
to concur with Jeannin in pressing for acceptance of a long
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Lee, James I and Henry IV, p. 86.
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 7 August,
8 October 1608, Winwood, pp. 427-9, 433-5.
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truce.

The commissioners were to use their own discretion

on specific provisions, but James, convinced the French
would do nothing to harm their relations with Spain or the
States, expected no differences of opinion.

To handle

Dutch opposition of a truce, Winwood and Spencer were to
remind them that they were in no position to refuse;
failure to negotiate would force them into a disastrous
war without English or French aid.

These arguments, along

with a previous pledge to apply the defensive alliance to
95
a truce, temporized much of the Dutch resistance.
Although the English and French envoys collaborated
closely over the next several months, all parties recog
nized France as the leading advocate of peace.

Winwood and

Spencer took a back seat as the Dutch, Spanish, and Flemish
deputies turned to Jeannin for direction.
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England's

subordinate position became a public embarrassment to James
as the result of an oversight by Jean Richardot, head of
the Flemish deputation at The Hague.

In early October the

Archduke ordered Richardot to return to Brussels, and when
vacating his room, the minister inadvertently left secret
instructions from Albert in the drawer of his writing
table.

These directions, which were passed to the Dutch
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 2 September
1608, ibid., pp. 429-31.
96

Browne to Lisle, 7 October 1608 , De L'Isle, IV,
pp. 51-2; Edmondes to Cecil, 26 October 1608, Salisbury,
XX, pp. 260-1.
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States-General and eventually printed, charged Richardot
to place more confidence in the French than in the English.
In response to this affront, James lashed out against
others.

He attacked the French for using the negotiations

to increase their glory and accused the Archduke and Philip
of ignoring English efforts to secure peace.

The monarch

commanded Winwood and Spencer to inform Richardot that
Albert's preference for French counsel gave England little
reason to continue supporting his quest for a truce.
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Actually, James's dissatisfaction had the opposite
affect.

The English soon intensified their defense of the

truce in an effort to convince Oldenbarneveldt, Philip, and
Albert of their industry for peace.

In late October Winwoo

delivered a remonstrance to the States-General informing
them in absolute terms that no aid would be forthcoming if
a truce was not accepted.

James, he emphasized, was "too

just, too religious and too peaceful to foment a war, which
however just to begin with would show as unjust from the
99
refusal of peace."

The English exhortations became so
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Browne to Lisle, 7 October 1608, De L'Isle, IV,
pp. 51 2; Marc Antonio Correr to Doge and Senate, 2/12
October 1608, Venetian, p. 179.
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Privy Council to Winwood and Spencer, 8 October
1608, Winwood, pp. 433-5.
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Winwood's Remonstrance to the States, 10 October
1608, De L'Isle, IV, pp. 61-2.
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numerous and forceful over the next few weeks that Jeannin
found it necessary to restrain Winwood and Spencer in their
sudden exuberance for peace.
impressed William Browne.

England's firm stand even

In a letter to his superior,

Viscount Lisle, he apologized for his previous opposition
to peace, contending that he "had never till now known our
king's mind.
The English pleadings did not shake the conviction
among many in the United Provinces that James would not
allow the States to fall into inimical hands.

Led by

Maurice of Nassau, these war advocates resisted a truce.
Opposition was particularly strong in Zeeland where they
refused to discuss a settlement unless Spain recognized
Dutch independence for the duration of the peace.

102

Albert

had conceded this point in September and claimed to speak
for Spain as well, but Philip's acknowledgment was slow in
coming.

To soften Dutch reluctance, the English and French

deputies appeared before the States-General and repeated
their threat to withdraw all aid if the Dutch failed to

"*"^Lee, James I and Henry IV, p. 126.
"^"'"Browne to Lisle, 23 October 1608, De L' Isle, IV,
pp. 64-5.
1 0?

Browne to Lisle, 7 November 1608, ibid., pp. 70-1.
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accept a truce.

By mid-November Maurice and the Zee-

landers had yielded to this pressure.

They embraced truce

negotiations on the condition that no final agreement
could be reached without Spanish approval.
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England's sudden and tenacious resolve for peace had
revived its sagging credibility at The Hague, but two
incidents soon caused a renewed questioning of James's
reliability.

In November Archduke Albert, on orders from

Madrid, dispatched Ferdinando de Giron to thank James for
his staunch peace advocacy.

The Dutch and French suspected,

however, that de Giron's real objective was to press for a
moderation of Dutch sovereignty demands.

These mis

givings multiplied when on November 29 Richardot wrote a
letter identifying James as responsible for the Spanish
delay in recognizing an independent United Provinces.
Philip, Richardot noted, had been willing to accept Dutch
sovereignty until James offered to secure a twenty-year
truce without mention of independence.

The English
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Browne to Lisle, 5 September 1608; Proclamation
from the States, 20 October 1608, ibid., pp. 41-4, 54-5;
Antonio Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 10/20 November 1608,
Venetian, pp. 190-1.
•^^Extract from the Register of the Resolutions of the
Council of State, 13 November 1608, De L'Isle, IV, pp. 74-5.
"^^Edmondes to Cecil, 16 November, 23 November 1608,
Salisbury, XX, pp. 268, 270.
^"^Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 12/22 December 1608 ,
Venetian, p. 203; Edmondes to Cecil, 30 November 1608,
De L1 Isle, IV, pp. 318-20.
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vehemently denied these charges.

Claiming this had never

been "so much as imagined by His Majesty, much less
intimated by any of his ministers," Cecil attacked Richardot
for spreading deliberate falsehoods to encourage distrust
of James.

Thomas Edmondes maintained that the Flemish had

contrived the entire episode to disgrace James rather than
the Archduke in case Philip refused to recognize the States'
independence.
In truth, there is little evidence to uphold Richardot's
allegations.

In mid-November Jeannin and Winwood, weary of

Philip's hesitancy, had sent Charles de l'Aubespine, abbe
de Preaux, one of Jeannin's aides, to Brussels to ask Albert
what the Spanish intentions were.

The Archduke told the

envoy that Don Pedro de Toledo, not James, was responsible
for suggesting to Philip that a truce might be possible
without the distasteful concession of autonomy.

Later, the

Flemish altered the story and implicated Charles Cornwallis.
Preaux cautioned Albert against espousing this type of
agreement, emphasizing that neither France nor England
would advocate a truce that did not recognize a Dutch
state.
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Furthermore, Giron met with little success when

107Cecil

to Winwood and Spencer, 23 December 1608,
Winwood, pp. 466-7; Edmondes to Cecil, 21 December 1608,
De L'Isle, IV, pp. 321-3.
108Edmondes

to Cecil, 30 November, 7 December 1608,
De L'Isle, IV, pp. 318-20, 320-1; Cecil to Winwood and
Spencer, 23 December 1608, Winwood, pp. 466-7.
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he asked the English monarch to procure more favorable
conditions for the Spanish.

James berated the legate,

declaring he would take no part in such a plan.

According

to the English king, nothing would bring peace more quickly
than Philip's endorsement of the Archduke's stand."'"®®
True or not, Richardot's accusation temporarily dis
tressed the cooperative relationship between France and
England that had so effectively expounded the truce.

Henry

viewed James's alleged offer as a further example of English
duplicity.

England's desire to please Spain, he believed,

had caused them to deceive their allies and chance the
breakdown of negotiations.
intentions as well.

The English distrusted French

Henry's quickness to blame James for

the slowness in the truce talks induced Edmondes to remark
that "the French king plays not all his balls above the
line," while Cecil wondered why Preaux had agreed with
Richardot's charges."^®
stabilized.

Eventually Anglo-French relations

The increased skepticism of England's sincerity

moved James to commit himself even more closely to the
French course of action.

Anxious to reestablish his repu

tation as a peace advocate, James assured Henry in early

109Cecil

to Edmondes, 28 December 1608, Salisbury,
XX, p. 285; Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 31 December 1608,
Winwood, pp. 469-71.
^^Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 23 December 1608,
Winwood, pp. 466-7; Edmondes to Cecil, 7 January 1609,
De L'Isle, IV, p. 324.
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January that he would "never sever himself from His Most
Christian Majesty's [Henry's] prudent views.""'"'''"'"
Despite the commotion over James's actions, progress
toward a truce continued.

In December, while the tumult

was at its height, the Dutch extended the cease-fire for
two months, hoping that a settlement could soon be reached. 1 1 2
Meanwhile, irritated by Spain's slowness to acknowledge
sovereignty, Archduke Albert dispatched his confessor,
Inigo Brizuela, to sway Philip on this issue.

His efforts

were not wasted, for on January 19 the Spanish monarch
finally agreed to concede Dutch independence for the length
of a truce.

Though they desired more, the Dutch accepted

this offer, leaving a trade agreement as the last obstacle
113
to the long awaited peace.
As a truce appeared more and more certain, James and
Cecil inveighed against the perception that England had
delayed negotiations.

This attitude, Cecil feared, :\rould

deprive James of his credit due for advancing the truce,

Antonio Foscarini to Doge and Senate, 4/14 January,
31 January/10 February 1609, Venetian, pp. 217-8, 229-30.
112Edmondes

to Cecil, 21 December 1608, Salisbury, XX,

p. 284.
113Giustinian

to Doge and Senate, 27 December 1608/
6 January; Soranzo to Doge and Senate, 23 January/2 Feb
ruary 1609; Correr to Doge and Senate, 17/27 February 1609,
Venetian, pp. 196, 226, 237-8.
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and the secretary ordered his ministers to take all possible
measures to demonstrate England's craving for peace.

James

denied emphatically that he had promised to secure a truce
without sovereignty, arguing this was inconceivable con
Concern for credibility led

sidering Dutch demands.

England to adhere even more closely to the French line.

In

a March 2 note that acknowledged Jeannin's preeminence, the
Privy Council advised Winwood and Spencer to remain in close
contact with the French minister, concuring with his deci
sions at all times.
A settlement on the trade issue proved elusive to the
negotiators, now gathered at Antwerp.

Albert, following

Philip's instructions, generally recognized Dutch trade
rights in areas controlled by Spain but withheld specific
mention of the Indies.

This was unacceptable to the States

and an impasse developed.*"''^

The English and French com

missioners attempted to break this stalemate by pledging
to guarantee a Dutch presence in the Indies if the Arch
duke's deputies would give assurance that Albert interpreted
the general trade provision to include the area.

Richardot

"'""'"^Cecil to Winwood and Spencer, 4 February 1609;
Cecil to Cornwallis, 12 February 1609, Winwood, pp. 476-7,
478-9.
115Cecil

to Winwood and Spencer, 2 March 1609, ibid.,

pp. 481-3.
116Correr

to Doge and Senate, 17/27 February 1609,
Venetian, pp. 2 37-8.
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offered an oral promise to this affect, making the trade
article acceptable to all parties.

Although James had

originally demanded a written guarantee, French pressures
and fears that any delays would be blamed on England forced
him to warrant Dutch trade based on Richardot's oral
117
promise.
The settlement of the Indies trade cleared
the way for peace.

On March 29, 1609 the negotiators

signed an agreement that stopped hostilities for twelve
years.

The Twelve Years Truce was a significant victory

for the United Provinces.

They received recognition of

their sovereignty, forfeited no territory, secured trade
rights in the Indies, and made no concessions to Cathol
icism.

In short, the Dutch had won all they could real-

istically expect but permanent peace.
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Despite numerous claims to the contrary, England
exerted little influence during the two years of negotia
tions leading to the Twelve Years Truce.

Fearful that

their national interests would be harmed if either the
Dutch or the Spanish were antagonized, James and Cecil
adopted a policy of equivocation, which allowed the French,
consistent in support of peace, to direct the course of

117Winwood

to Privy Council, 16 March 1609; Cecil
to Winwood and Spencer, 20 March 1609, Winwood, pp. 491-2,
488-90.
118Birch,

An Historical View of the Negotiations,
p. 293; also see Lee, James I and Henry IV, pp. 133-4.
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events.

In early 1607 English refusals to maintain the

States' war effort made negotiations a necessity, but,
reluctant to anger anyone, James avoided a strong stand.
Slow to send a deputation to The Hague and hesitant to
commit them to action, the English enabled Jeannin to
assume the dominant role as mediator.

Their ardor to please

the United Provinces and Spain generated an endorsement of
peace negotiations after the first Spanish agreation
arrived in October, but as events and attitudes altered,
the English balked in their support.

By the end of 1607

James's and Cecil's unwillingness to offend others led them
to forsake all initiative in the negotiations.

Hoping to

avoid major errors, England chose to respond to rather than
dictate events at The Hague.

Throughout 1608 the English

moved cautiously, committing themselves when French actions
made it necessary.

They concluded a defensive alliance

with the States but only after the Dutch, frustrated by
James's equivocation, had agreed to a pact with Henry.
When the French threw their support behind a truce, England
quickly followed, convinced that Henry's position mirrored
Spanish and Dutch desires.

Suspicions generated by the

Giron mission and Richardot's actions drove James to
intensify his support of the truce, and as the discussions
moved inexorably to a conclusion, he adhered even more
closely to Henry in expectation of a share in credit for
peace.
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It was the French, however, who determined the out
come of the negotiations.

As he had in the Venetian Crisis

of 1606, James rejected a leadership role while Henry,
certain of what he wanted, served notice that he would
direct the course of events in Europe.

In the light of

circumstances later in 1609, James's ambivalent policies
assumed a greater significance.

When a controversy devel

oped over the Cleves-Julich succession less than six months
after the signing of the Twelve Years Truce, James again
passively stood by as Henry brought the continent to the
brink of war in his drive to dismember the House of
Hapsburg.
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